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Abstract
The Nazis inherited a weak economy, withered by the Great Depression and periods of hyperinflation, when
they took power in 1933. Over the next six years, primarily through a military buildup, the Nazi economy
grew like none other in the world. This paper traces the methods the Nazis used to finance this economic
rebound. Through an analysis of secret government documents, Nuremburg witness statements, and the latest
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Further, it finds that by September 1939, the economy was in a state of dangerous disarray.
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The Great Depression hit Germany harder than it did any 
other European country.1 With a fragile economy that was 
financed primarily by foreign short term loans, the country endured 
a banking crisis when the 1929 stock market crash caused these 
loans to be called back. The crisis reached its trough at the close of 
1931 when Herbert Hoover had to allow Germany a one year 
reparations holiday to avoid a total economic collapse. Three 
successive governments failed to stimulate employment before the 
Nazis came to power in January 1933.2 The ensuing miraculous 
growth of the German economy, the quickest in history, causes one 
to ask how the government financed the recovery. 3 This paper 
attempts to document the Nazis’ financing methods, both on a 
domestic and global scale. It argues that these methods were 
unsustainable, leading to economic uncertainty by the time war 
broke out in 1939. 
Upon taking power, the Nazis immediately implemented an 
expansionary fiscal policy that encouraged job growth through 
                                                          
1 Albrecht Ritschl, “Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938: A 
Critical Reassessment,” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 
16, no. 4 (December 2002): 561. 
2 Hans-Erich Volkmann, “The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for 
War,” in Germany and the Second World War, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), 161–63. 
3 Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi 
Economy (New York: Penguin, 2006), xxv. 
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civil building projects and the rearmament of the German 
military.4 Over 140,126 jobs were created in July 1933 as opposed 
to 23,665 in January 1933. By November the average monthly 
growth in jobs had reached 400,000.5 This extremely positive 
growth trend continued to 1936, at which time the economy 
reached full employment.6 The Gross National Product (GNP) 
increased 9% annually while state demand as a share of GNP 
increased from 14% to 31% between 1933 and 1938.7 The Nazis 
paradoxically managed to keep inflation and deficit spending low 
during this remarkable feat of government sponsored recovery.8 
Though these statistics suggest a command economy had taken 
hold, the Nazis actually undertook a campaign of privatizing 
businesses.9 The resulting set of circumstances led one 21st century 
economist to remark  
 
                                                          
4 Raymond L Cohn, “Fiscal Policy in Germany During the Great Depression,” 
Explorations in Economic History 29, no. 3 (July 1, 1992): 338; Rainer 
Fremdling and Reiner Stäglin, “Work Creation and Rearmament in Germany 
1933-1938: A Revisionist Assessment of NS-Economic Policy Based on Input-
Output Analysis” (Discussion Papers, Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung, 2015), 1. 
5 R. J. Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 1932-1938 (London: Macmillan 
Press, 1982), 53. 
6 Cohn, “Fiscal Policy in Germany During the Great Depression,” 319. 
7 Guido Giacomo Preparata, “Money for the Third Reich: The Nazis’ Financial 
Legerdemain, 1933-1938” (Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1998), 7; 
Christoph Buchheim and Jonas Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the 
Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry,” The Journal of Economic History 66, no. 
2 (June 2006): 390. 
8 Burton H. Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), 32. 
9 Germà Bel, “Against the Mainstream: Nazi Privatization in 1930s Germany,” 
The Economic History Review 63, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 35–37. Command 
economies exist when the central government plans the nation’s major economic 
ventures. A key characteristic of command economies is government ownership 
of the state’s largest companies. 
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We conclude that the Nazi recovery was not a 
textbook exercise in Keynesian demand 
stimulation… Economic recovery in Germany in 
the 1930s remains the paradox case of public 
demand expansion without Keynesian demand 
creation.10 
 
The catalyst for such an atypical recovery was a sustained 
government campaign to grow the military. Full scale rearmament 
had begun by 1934,  and 70% of government expenditures had 
gone toward it by 1939.11 However, the Nazis felt it necessary to 
completely hide such spending from official figures until March 
1935 since rearmament was illegal per the Treaty of Versailles.12 
There was the added concern of causing inflation. It was clear that 
early in the Nazis’ reign Hitler did not want to induce inflation, 
which would scare Germans, who had vivid memories of the 1923 
hyperinflation.13 He was even willing to harm Germany’s fragile 
foreign trade position to inhibit inflation.14 
                                                          
10 Ritschl, “Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938,” 577. 
11 Ibid.; Fremdling and Stäglin, “Work Creation and Rearmament in Germany 
1933-1938,” 23; David Sanz Bas, “An Austrian Analysis of the Nazi Economic 
Recovery (1933-1939),” Procesos de Mercado 8, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 294. 
12 Hjalmar Schacht, “Unsigned Schacht Memorandum to Hitler Concerning the 
Financing of the Armament Program,” May 3, 1935, 2, 1168-PS, In Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946. 
The Nazis no longer needed to hide military spending figures because, in March 
of 1935, Hitler announced Germany’s rearmament plans to the world, officially 
breaking one of the world’s worst kept secrets. 
13 Harold James, “Schacht’s Attempted Defection from Hitler’s Germany,” The 
Historical Journal 30, no. 3 (1987): 729; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 76; 
Martin Wolfe, “The Development of Nazi Monetary Policy,” The Journal of 
Economic History 15, no. 4 (December 1, 1955): 392. 
14 “Affidavit I of Emil Puhl,” November 7, 1945, 3, EC-437, In Nazi Conspiracy 
and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946.; Klein, 
Germany’s Economic Preparations for War, 5. 
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Hitler essentially wanted all the positives of heavy 
government spending without the negatives. In response, the 
architect of the recovery, Reichsbank President Hjalmar Schacht, 
created MeFo bills. At their simplest, MeFo bills were bills of 
exchange.15 They were issued by the industrial company 
Metallurgische ForschungsAnstalt (Metallurgical Research 
Institution). But this company was a dummy corporation, cobbled 
together by Schacht and German heads of industry with a 
capitalization of only 250,000 Reichsmarks (RM).16 The MeFo 
corporation would fund rearmament projects by issuing these bills 
of exchange, which contractors could discount for RMs at private 
banks. These banks were willing to hold MeFo bills because the 
Reichsbank, Germany’s central bank, guaranteed to re-discount 
them. To further entice investors, MeFo bills carried an interest 
rate of 4%, which was higher than that of other trade bills at the 
time. To make sure that the bills were never exchanged for RMs, 
which would lead to inflation, the ninety-day maturation period for 
the bills kept being extended until the actual maturation period 
became five years.17 Summing up how unethical MeFo bills were, 
the Russian Nuremburg judge Iona Nikitchenko called them “a 
swindling venture on a national scale that has no precedent.”18 
From 1934 to 1938, the Nazis funded rearmament through 
12 billion RMs worth of MeFo bills.19 These MeFo bills allowed 
the government to exclude this figure from their official 
                                                          
15 For an exhaustive account of the MeFo bills system, see Preparata, “The 
Nazis’ Financial Legerdemain,” 9–94. 
16 Guido Giacomo Preparata, “Hitler’s Money: The Bills of Exchange of 
Schacht and Rearmament in the Third Reich,” American Review of Political 
Economy 1, no. 1 (December 1, 2002): 21. 
17 Christopher Kopper, “Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39,” 
Financial History Review 5, no. 1 (April 1998): 59. 
18 International Military Tribunal, Opinion and Judgement, 169. 
19 Kopper, “Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39,” 59. 
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expenditure statements (so no inflation could occur) and to 
circumvent the Central Banking Law, which prohibited the 
Reichsbank from funding the government.20 Perhaps most 
importantly, the MeFo bills also allowed the government to hide its 
rearmament financing from the world until Hitler was ready to 
reveal it in March 1935.21 The Nazis knew that dealing in MeFo 
bills was a risky maneuver with the potential for immediate 
collapse and Reichsbank officials hoped that the budget would 
balance before banks decided to rediscount their MeFo bills.22  
After issuing MeFo bills, the Nazis further financed the 
recovery by controlling capital markets, which enabled them to co-
opt private businesses into funding the rearmament and other 
desirable, autarkical programs. Instead of nationalizing 
corporations as the Soviets did, the Nazis provided strong 
incentives for businesses to invest in Reich friendly programs.23 
For example, the Loan Fund Law of December 1934 capped 
dividend payments at 6% of reserves and taxed the surplus.24 
Whereas the retained earnings of private companies had been 170 
million RM in 1933, earnings increased to 3,420 million RM by 
1938. Of those reserves, over 62% were reinvested into the 
economy.25 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Schacht, “Unsigned Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler,” 2; Hjalmar 
Schacht, “Correspondence between Schacht and Hitler,” January 11, 1939, EC-
369, In Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing 
Office, 1946. 
22 “Affidavit II of Emil Puhl,” November 8, 1945, 2, EC-438, In Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government Printing Office, 1946. 
23 Buchheim and Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi 
Economy,” 395. 
24 Wolfe, “The Development of Nazi Monetary Policy,” 397. 
25 Robert Clement Engström, “Nazi War Finance and the German War 
Economy” (MBA, University of Pennsylvania, 1968), 45. 
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By 1936, the government also influenced where this capital 
was reinvested. One method was through the tight rationing and 
regulation of raw materials. Germany was a net importer of raw 
materials.26 Therefore the Nazis found it important to reallocate 
their scarce supply of raw materials through supervisory boards to 
help rearmament. This reallocation made it hard for companies to 
get the amount of raw materials necessary to fund their own 
projects.27 However, the Nazis would release more raw materials 
for projects deemed important for rearmament or reaching autarky. 
Thus it became profitable in many instances for companies to 
pursue the goals of the Reich. As a result, private investment in 
autarkical industries grew more than seven-fold by 1937.28 
Furthermore, even though 42% of that year’s GDP growth came 
from military spending, the private sector’s fiscal contribution to 
said GDP growth was 79%.29 However the Nazis’ reliance on the 
private sector had its limits. Companies still considered the 
potential for long term profit and it was clear that rearmament 
could not continue forever. This mentality dictated that they would 
not produce rearmament goods at as high a rate as the Nazis 
desired.30  
An ancillary effect of increased private reinvestment was 
that large investment banks lost a considerable amount of business 
since companies no longer needed industrial loans to finance new 
                                                          
26 Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War; Tooze, The Wages of 
Destruction, 50; Volkmann, “The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for 
War,” 349. 
27 Buchheim and Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi 
Economy,” 398. 
28 Jonas Scherner, “Nazi Germany’s Preparation for War: Evidence from 
Revised Industrial Investment Series,” European Review of Economic History 
14, no. 3 (December 1, 2010): 442. 
29 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 63. 
30 Buchheim and Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi 
Economy,” 399. 
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projects.31 Consequently, companies became more dependent on 
the Reich than investment banks because the Reich controlled the 
imports of raw material that production required. The Nazis’ 
capital controls handcuffed the investment banks and they 
essentially became depositories for MeFo bills.32 Once the 
investment banks became disabled, the meaningful supply of 
money shifted to private savings banks. Again, the Reich took 
advantage. Despite a 77% increase in deposits, the banks’ loans to 
private debtors surprisingly decreased from 1933 to 1938.33 For a 
variety of reasons, the Reich could control these banks’ loans more 
than they could control those of investment banks 
 
There were three main reasons why the Reich 
reserved the refinancing power of savings banks for 
itself and why the savings banks could easily be 
moved by material incentives. First, their structure 
of long-term liabilities made such banks 
extraordinarily fit for taking on long-term loans in 
their portfolios. Although saving deposits were 
legally short-term liabilities, in aggregate they 
fluctuated only slightly so that they could be 
reinvested in long-term loans without risking 
illiquidity. Second, the Reichsbank recognised 
Reich loans as liquid assets which meant that 
savings banks could easily fulfil the liquidity 
standards of the Reichskommissar fur das 
Kreditwesen [Reich Commissioner for credit 
                                                          
31 Kopper, “Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39,” 56; Tooze, The 
Wages of Destruction, 110. 
32 Engström, “Nazi War Finance,” 34; Wolfe, “The Development of Nazi 
Monetary Policy,” 401. 
33 Kopper, “Banking in National Socialist Germany, 1933–39,” 58. 
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business]. Third, the interest paid on Reich loans 
was significantly higher than that on private bills, 
which fell from 4.1 per cent to 3.3 per cent. 34 
 
Because of these conditions, private savings banks played a large 
part in refinancing long-term government debt as well as investing 
in rearmament industries. Their holding of government debt in 
1939 was 6.5 times higher than it was in 1933.35 These banks 
became the third major financier of the recovery after MeFo bills 
and private corporations.  
With such risky methods of financing, the confidence and 
trust of the parties involved was paramount. The Nazis needed to 
provide economic stability to keep confidence in their unorthodox 
methods high. To this end, they instituted strict wage and price 
controls. Two months after taking power in 1933, the Nazis 
eliminated collective bargaining rights and unions and replaced 
them with the Nazi affiliated German Labor Front. The role of this 
organization was to keep worker morale high through fascist 
indoctrination and middle class comforts such as vacations, 
company picnics, and Volkswagens. New laws were passed in 
early 1934 that gave government appointed labor trustees the 
power to regulate wages for whole industries.36 The Nazis 
succeeded in keeping wage rates at depression levels throughout 
the recovery, which benefitted the recovery by decreasing 
consumption and freeing corporations to produce more 
rearmament focused goods through increased earnings that had to 
                                                          
34 Ibid., 57–58. 
35 Engström, “Nazi War Finance,” 40. 
36 Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War, 66; Engström, “Nazi War 
Finance,” 20. 
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be reinvested in production per the Loan Fund Law.37 Another 
advantage was that companies’ profits would directly increase as 
technological improvements and economies of scale decreased 
production costs. These profits also meant there was more money 
available for reinvestment.  
Despite the wage controls, private consumption had to rise 
as unemployment decreased.38 As this began to occur, 
representatives from the Labor Front voiced their concern that 
workers were unhappy that price increases in consumer goods 
were not met with wage increases. In 1936 the problem worried the 
Nazis enough that they created the Office for Price Formation, 
which audited consumer businesses and told them what to charge 
for their products.39 Oversight was so strict that the Reich even 
regulated whether certain hotels could give jam with breakfast.40 
Naturally, the Nazis granted more profitable price structures to 
companies that produced more rearmament goods.41 Harsh 
punishments for evading the Nazis regulations, including 
execution, prevented the formation of large black markets. The 
Office for Price Formation is yet another example of how the 
Nazis manipulated the free market to encourage businesses to 
reduce their production of luxury goods and instead focus on goods 
necessary for autarky. As seen with their control over wages, the 
Nazis’ control over prices proved largely successful; the cost of 
                                                          
37 Overy, The Nazi Economic Recovery, 57; Volkmann, “The National Socialist 
Economy in Preparation for War,” 290. 
38 As more people became employed, money flowed from the government and 
private businesses to the workers. The workers, naturally, spent some of this 
money, which meant that private consumption would rise. 
39 Engström, “Nazi War Finance,” 28; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 231. 
40 Wolfe, “The Development of Nazi Monetary Policy,” 396. 
41 Ibid., 395. 
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living was only 6% higher in 1938 than it was in 1933 despite 
massive economic growth.42 
While these internal policies kept the domestic economy 
stable during the mid-1930s, the stability came at the expense of 
Germany’s foreign exchange reserves. Though the Nazis aimed for 
autarky, the reality was that Germany needed to import ever-
growing amounts of food and raw materials to feed the rearmament 
economy.43 Germany had always needed to import these resources. 
However, the loss of territory mandated by the Treaty of Versailles 
exacerbated the problem, reducing Germany’s agricultural capacity 
15% for many important crops and its iron ore capacity by 75%.44 
Shortages in steel, iron ore, copper, and oil could not be met by 
increased production, necessitating the importation of those crucial 
war machine materials.45 The Nazis’ rearmament financial 
practices and labor laws crowded out investment for exports and 
consumer goods, which strained German foreign exchange 
reserves even more to compensate.46  
Whereas the Nazis’ economic policy solutions and 
financing methods kept domestic confidence high, they sent 
international confidence in its economy into a tailspin. While 
Germany’s antagonistic general foreign policy no doubt played a 
role, their financial decisions must be heavily considered in an 
analysis of their foreign trade weakness. To begin with, a 
moratorium on foreign debt payments in 1933 and a purposeful 
                                                          
42 Ibid., 396; Volkmann, “The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for 
War,” 294. 
43 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 50. 
44 Volkmann, “The National Socialist Economy in Preparation for War,” 160. 
45 Klein, Germany’s Economic Preparations for War, 41–44, 50. 
46 Bas, “An Austrian Analysis of the Nazi Economic Recovery (1933-1939),” 
308; Buchheim and Scherner, “The Role of Private Property in the Nazi 
Economy,” 390; Ritschl, “Deficit Spending in the Nazi Recovery, 1933–1938,” 
559. 
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default on these payments in 1934 surely did the Reich no favors.47 
It was also lost on no one that if the Reich had the funds to rearm, 
it could surely pay back its foreign debts first.48 The effect of this 
mentality was seen in early 1935 when German bond prices began 
to steadily decline on the world market until they reached rock 
bottom once war commenced in September 1939.49  
It fell to Hjalmar Schact to minimize Germany’s foreign 
trade troubles. Introduced in 1934, his collection of initiatives was 
called the New Plan. One such initiative to remedy the Germans’ 
lack of food and raw materials was to pressure weaker countries in 
Eastern Europe and South America into bilateral clearing 
agreements with Germany. Per these agreements, trade would be 
conducted either through barter or, if necessary, in RMs so that 
foreign exchange-reserves were never used.50 By 1938, clearing 
agreements had been signed with over forty countries, who 
collectively bought about 80% of Germany’s exports.51 In order to 
avoid devaluing the RM, Schacht devised a clever bond 
discounting/subsidy scheme that subsidized German exporters on 
foreign financial markets.52 With this plan, Schact was effectively 
able to give exporters the competitive advantage of currency 
                                                          
47 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 72; Albrecht Ritschl, “Reparations, 
Deficits, and Debt Default: The Great Depression in Germany,” in The Great 
Depression of the 1930s: Lessons for Today, ed. Nicholas Crafts and Peter 
Fearon (OUP Oxford, 2013), 118. 
48 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 80. 
49 Schacht, “Unsigned Memorandum from Schacht to Hitler,” 2; William O. 
Brown and Richard C. K. Burdekin, “German Debt Traded in London During 
the Second World War: A British Perspective on Hitler,” Economica 69, no. 276 
(November 1, 2002): 655–69. 
50 “Affidavit I of Emil Puhl,” 3. 
51 Ibid. 
52 For further explanation, see: David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the 
Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern 
Europe, 1930-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 140–41. 
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devaluation while avoiding the inherent increases in import prices 
and the national debt.  
However, with the 1935 fall in bond prices, this mechanism 
became untenable and Schacht told the army that he would not be 
able to fulfill their rising demand for imported raw materials.53 To 
remedy the situation, he had to impose a new, large tax on the 
businesses profiting from the rearmament in order to keep exports 
competitive.54 This tax proved effective; exports rose, allowing 
imports of raw materials to rise as well. The government used 
supervisory boards to control the allocation of these imports across 
the country.55 Since these imports primarily went to rearmament 
(metals) or autarkic industries (primarily food), production of 
consumer goods decreased. In fact, there was no increase in 
consumer production from 1934 to 1936 despite the economic 
growth caused by the recovery.56 
Schacht had to damage domestic happiness in order to 
shore up foreign exchange shortfalls. This would hurt the Reich 
over time as average Germans began to notice that their quality of 
life had decreased despite the country’s theoretical prosperity.57 
The idea of working for the benefit of the state was not enough to 
stop workers from asking for promotions, especially once workers 
knew that unemployment was low, making each one of them more 
valuable to their companies. To keep wages stagnant, the Nazis 
passed laws to keep workers in their current jobs and even assert 
that workers could be reassigned at will to industries with labor 
                                                          
53 Hjalmar Schacht, “Letter from Schacht to Reich and Prussian Economics 
Minister Concerning Army Demands for Raw Material,” December 24, 1935, 
EC-293, In Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. United States Government 
Printing Office, 1946. 
54 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 92. 
55 Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War, 132. 
56 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 94–95. 
57 Ibid., 162–65. 
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shortages.58 The effect was that workers put in less effort and 
domestic production became less efficient.59 
As 1939 inched closer and Germany began to annex land to 
the east, Schacht had to keep rearmament growth high despite an 
ever worsening foreign trade situation and decreased efficiency at 
home. The 1938 annexation of Austria provided a much needed 
infusion of foreign exchange reserves, equivalent to 782 million 
RM, which doubled Germany’s supply.60 This allowed Schacht in 
1938 to run the largest German trade deficit since 1929.61 
However, the acquisition of Austria actually hurt Germany in the 
long run because, like Germany, Austria was an importer of food 
and raw materials.62 By the start of 1939, the Austrian foreign 
exchange reserves were exhausted.63 Schacht had to get more 
desperate with his foreign trade practices. 
Due to the Nazis’ policy for years of keeping the RM 
sheltered from the free market both domestically and abroad, it 
became increasingly difficult to value as a currency. The countries 
who had clearing agreements with Germany wanted to trade less 
with it as a result, instead preferring hard currency countries such 
as Great Britain.64 As Germany’s importation needs became ever 
greater, Schacht began to rely less on clever financial tricks than 
on outright economic bullying of Eastern European countries. The 
most extreme case was a one-sided deal with Romania he signed in 
                                                          
58 Engström, “Nazi War Finance,” 21; Klein, Germany’s Economic 
Preparations for War, 66. 
59 Timothy W. Mason, “The Workers’ Opposition in Nazi Germany,” History 
Workshop, no. 11 (April 1, 1981): 127. 
60 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 246. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War, 245. 
63 Schacht, “Correspondence between Schacht and Hitler,” 3. 
64 Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War, 138–
39. 
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late 1938.65 Romania had to accept German arms exports in 
exchange for foodstuffs, oil, and other materials the German 
economy needed. This deal so strained Romania that they had to 
import raw materials themselves to keep up with the German 
demand.66 It is interesting to note that Poland, the first victim of 
the German blitzkrieg, was one country that held its ground and 
refused to make a trade deal with Germany.67 
Despite  Schacht’s efforts, Germany was unable to keep up 
with its import demands and Hitler dictated that the shortages hit 
normal Germans instead of hindering the rearmament effort. In an 
urgent letter written in January 1939, Schacht told Hitler, 
“Especially in the field of daily requirements for the home and 
clothing, the lack of supply and above all the decline of quality is 
most evident.”68 The analysis of labor historian Tim Mason puts it 
best 
 
The whole economic system was so strained that 
any one hold-up immediately caused another. These 
multiple shortages, which constituted a kind of 
negative multiplier effect, were the chief 
distinguishing mark of the situation just before the 
outbreak of war… it was a general economic 
crisis.69 
 
The confidence of the people and the confidence of businesses and 
banks was what the Reich, by necessity, valued most. Even though 
                                                          
65 Ibid., 265. 
66 Ibid., 269–70. 
67 R. J. Overy, “Germany, ‘Domestic Crisis’ and War in 1939: Reply,” Past & 
Present, no. 122 (February 1, 1989): 228. 
68 Schacht, “Correspondence between Schacht and Hitler,” 3. 
69 Timothy W. Mason, Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 116. 
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there were food and import shortages, they were never so severe as 
to put the country at risk of starvation. Having enough food to eat 
was not the point; confidence in the Nazis was. The Nazis were 
frightened by how shortages may affect the public morale; a 
shortage would alert the average German to the frailty of the 
economy, which would damage support for the Nazis.  
While the supply shortage of early 1939 caused the 
working class to lose confidence in the Nazis’ economic prowess, 
MeFo bills did the same for businesses and banks. The MeFo bills 
that jumpstarted Germany’s miraculous recovery also threatened it 
the most. In March 1938, Schacht ended MeFo financing because 
he felt the system had gotten out of control.70 Finally Schacht had 
found a predicament from which he could not slither out. Many 
MeFo bills were also reaching maturity and the Reichsbank had to 
pay back the bills’ worth to their holders. But Hitler wanted to 
continue financing rearmament to the fullest. Schacht tried to sell 
long-term bonds to MeFo bills creditors instead of giving them 
hard cash, but they would not buy.71 His only recourse was to print 
money and run a deficit. But the rearmament campaign still 
demanded money as well. To plug this hole, in October 1938, 
Schacht tried to sell four packages of long-term bonds to the 
public, each containing 1.5 billion RM. Surprisingly, private savers 
and insurances funds bought the first three packages but the fourth 
one suffered a massive failure in late November after Schacht 
introduced it.72 The financiers of the Nazi economy had lost 
confidence a couple of months before the workers did at the start 
of 1939. 
                                                          
70 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 253. 
71 Ritschl, “Reparations, Deficits, and Debt Default: The Great Depression in 
Germany,” 120. 
72 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 295. 
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The result was that Schacht had to increase the money 
supply and run up a massive deficit to counterbalance the loss in 
capital and keep the rearmament going. From the start of Hitler’s 
reign to the end of MeFo bill financing, the amount of RMs in 
circulation rose from 3,560 million to 5,278 million. But from 
March to December 1938, currency circulation rose to 8,223 
million RMs, effectively rising more in ten months than it had in 
the previous five years.73 The deficit likewise rose enormously in 
this time though it had been increasing at a healthy pace 
previously. Schacht told Hitler that spending on the military would 
have to be cut or incredible inflation would ensue.74 Instead of 
listening to Schacht, Hitler fired him, electing to replace him with 
a loyal deputy named Walther Funk.75 Hitler instructed Funk to get 
prices, wages, and the foreign trade debacle under control using 
whatever means necessary.76 A short, obsequious letter written by 
Funk to Hitler regarding the status of the economy in mid-1939 
highlights the stark difference between Funk and Schacht as 
protectors of the German economy; Funk would do whatever 
Hitler demanded, regardless of the havoc it would wreak.77 In June 
1939, Hitler also abolished the Reichsbank limit for adding to the 
money supply, officially taking Germany off the gold standard it 
had speciously claimed to be on since the end of World War I.78 
After that, Funk instituted a war rationing system that gave the 
government draconian control over consumer goods with the 
justification that Germany was, or soon would be, at war. Funk’s 
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actions signaled a shift to the wartime economy that would 
generally dominate the Nazi state until its collapse in 1945. 
Taken as a whole, the Nazi economic recovery of the 1930s 
was like a balloon. The Nazis tried to fill the balloon with air but 
they could never tie the knot to keep it stable. Their choice was 
either to stop pumping air and let the balloon fizzle away or to 
keep pumping until it popped. The evidence indicates that they 
chose the latter. The Nazis’ call for immediate economic growth 
led to financing practices that produced massive short term gain 
with equally as massive long term consequences. The success of 
their policies regarding MeFo bills, the co-opting of the private 
sector, and the regulation of wages and prices all rested on 
domestic trust and confidence. While Germans trusted their 
economy for some years, the rest of the world, operating mostly on 
a free market basis, was skeptical. For an economy that relied 
heavily on imports, this was fatal. To prevent a total collapse of 
Germany’s foreign trade position, the Nazis had to make sacrifices 
that damaged domestic confidence. Eventually, these sacrifices 
became so great that confidence in the German economy faltered 
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